In the short period between the debates on accession to the EU (2002/3) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004) , the parties opposing EU accession (The League of Polish Families) or advocating renegotiation of the terms of membership (Self-Defence), shifted towards moderate support of the EU. Having accepted Polish membership in the EU, these parties have nonetheless remained reluctant to accept deeper political integration of the EU. Accordingly, in autumn 2004 not a single party opposed Polish membership of the EU.
I. Data
Empirical research for this project was conducted in the period from the 28 th October 2004 to the 31 st October 2005. In comparison to Western European states such as France or the UK, the level of media coverage of the issue was not particularly high in Poland, with the tabloid media being the least interested in the constitutional topics, as illustrated by the case of the newspaper Super Express, which contributed a total of just seven articles to the media debate.
Given the media selection, the main criteria were, firstly, to take into account the most influential media in Poland 5 and, secondly, to be properly representative of the Polish political spectrum. For that reason, not only were those left-or right-wing publications with the largest circulation selected, but also representatives of the more marginal Catholic media, constituting an interesting voice in the debate on the EU Constitution. Statistical data on circulation and public influence were obtained from reports by the Media Monitoring Institute as well as from the media in question. Secondary literature (Kitschelt, 1999; Grabowska, 2004) including other empirical analyses of the constitutional debate in Poland (Gaisbauer, 2006) were consulted to ensure a representative picture of political divisions in the national media.
Traditionally, media discourse analyses in Poland are based on the contents of the centreleft paper Gazeta Wyborcza and the centre-right Rzeczpospolita. For example, in his study of the constitutional debate in Poland Gaisbauer used these two dailies, albeit supplementing this somewhat limited selection by including the tabloid Super Express. Gaisbauer correctly established that coverage of the Constitution in the tabloids was incredibly small in comparison to that offered by the "quality" media, 6 information which would seem to support the theory that the EU Constitution was not of equal interest to all socio-economic strata of the Polish public. However, the data he used is by no means sufficient if one wishes to examine the true variety of positions on the Constitution in Poland. Therefore, this case study has been based not only on the largest dailies and tabloids but also on the weeklies, mainstream and also so-called sectoral. While secondary literature on the subject recognizes that these are the long and substantive editorials published in the weeklies that 'set the agenda' especially for EU-topics (Kevin, 2003; Trenz, 2004) , the sectoral media provide researchers with equally important although (or even precisely because) marginal or radical voices in any given debate.
The terms 'left' or 'right' are used in this article to describe the political orientation of the actors in the context of the Polish debate on the EU Constitution. It needs to be noted, however, that in the Polish (and, more generally, the Central European) context these terms have specific connotations that are missing in Western European usage. Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt, 1999; Markowski, 2002) noted that the political space of the Central European, post-communist state is organized along the nexus 'libertarian-authoritarian' cross-cuting with the nexus 'market-liberal economy versus state welfare.' In the Polish context it is possible to be even more specific and identify three such constitutive nexuses (Grabowska, 2004) : the attitude towards the communist past (strong de-communization versus forgiveness), the economy (welfare state versus market economy) and value systems (secularism/liberalism versus Christian values). For many people one of the three aspects is more important than another, and therefore, it is not necessary for all three dimensions to be in play in every particular case. One or two of the three intersecting dimensions that mark out Poland's political space can provide sufficient reason for any given voter to support a particular party. Interestingly, with the economic stagnation of the late nineties and an unemployment rate of almost 20%, all of the major parties became more 'social'. The major difference is that the welfare policies of the left-wing parties 7 A selection of 699 articles was taken from eight journals; three dailies, three weeklies, a tabloid and a special supplement of a daily tabloid. The three dailies in question were Rzeczpospolita with its centre-right orientation, the left-of-centre Gazeta Wyborcza and the sectoral Catholic-populist Nasz Dziennik. The three weeklies examined were Wprost, the leftist-liberal Newsweek (Polish edition) and the sectoral liberal-Catholic Tygodnik Powszechny. 10 The research sample also included the tabloid Super Express and the special supplement Europa, part of the daily tabloid Fakt.
11 Europa includes re-prints of articles written by well-known scholars such as Habermas, a strategy which, while it may lower the number of Polish contributors on the one hand, on the other provides an important insight into the non-Polish thought in Poland.
The Catholic public in Poland is divided into a 'moderate-liberal' camp representing the official position of the Catholic Church and a 'radical' camp which is in conflict with the Church authorities. The weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, our example of high-quality sectoral journalism, belongs to the moderate camp while the populist daily Nasz Dziennik belongs to the radical. The reason for selecting two Catholic journals from opposing camps was to establish whether the Catholic media converged or diverged on the topic of the EU Constitution. For a closer qualitative analysis, 29 substantive articles were selected from the whole set. 12 The selection strategy was three-fold: the sample was proportionate to the media coverage each month and it was composed of articles that were substantive or very relevant to the domestic discussion. In addition, the sample included articles dealing with important constitutional events which took place during the period of research (see Appendix 1-3). 9 In the early nineties Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first democratically elected Prime Minister and a long-term contributor to Tygodnik Powszechny advocated the drawing of a 'red line' between the communist past and the democratic present. His message was clear: the past should be 'closed' and we should all focus on building democracy in the future. The largest right-wing party, Law and Justice, is in favor of radical reexamination of public persons' activities during the communist period. 10 Initially the leftist weekly Polityka was going to be included; however, the journal's internet archives were unavailable during the period of data gathering. 11 Since spring 2006 the supplement Europa has appeared as part of the new Axel-Springer daily Dziennik. 12 The qualitative analysis was conducted using Atlas.ti software. Although coverage in the weeklies was not exactly extensive, the articles themselves discussing the constitutional process were quite substantive and evaluative. It was also a feature of the sectoral Nasz Dziennik that many academic terms such as politicization were misunderstood and misused. For that reason the categorisation ("coding") of such statements created many difficulties. In addition, one of the authors who contributed regularly to Nasz Dziennik would change his position on such crucial issues as support for the Polish EU membership literally from one article to the next. This in turn generated problems as far as pinpointing Nasz Dziennik's position on Polish 'support for the EU' was concerned. The lack of consistency also indicated that some authors may merely have been echoing third-party opinions which, to make matters worse, they had not fully understood.
In general it became evident that in the Polish media the European Constitution and the constitutional process did not feature high on the national agenda, neither in comparison to domestic issues (the presidential and parliamentary elections) nor in relation to EU accession.
II. Analysis

II.1 Actors
The major findings from the analysis of the actors who were instrumental in the debate are as follows: firstly, there was a low level of diversity among the Polish actors involved and, secondly, there was a low degree of personalization in the debate. The Polish debate was basically the domain of three types of actor: journalists, experts/academics, and executives. High-profile actors in the cross-border discussion were heads of states or party leaders while the EU level remained dominated by top-ranking officials. Non-governmental actors like NGOs were basically absent in the debate. Although voters/public were well represented in the debate, in terms of direct involvement they played a very passive role. The opinions of the Polish public were mostly represented by the other actors involved who frequently relied on social survey data. Foreign public opinion was represented but mostly in relation to referenda that were taking place abroad. Hence, in the Polish constitutional debate neither the public nor non-governmental organizations set the agenda. Seen in this light, the Polish debate had a strongly elitist character.
The low level of personalization, on the other hand, can be attributed to the fact that proponents of the Constitution were even less willing to promote the Treaty by name than its opponents. Before the elections too much was at risk for politicians to stake their personal reputations and good names on a project the outcome of which was very uncertain. Therefore, as long as parties had (strategically) announced their positions on the Constitution, individual actors were fairly reluctant to become personally engaged to the extent that, say, Jacques Chirac or Vaclav Klaus were. The electoral debate was dominated by political actors. For executives and party members, the Constitution was merely a vote-seeking or office-securing device. Therefore, instead of 'educational' campaigning, they often preferred simply to mirror their constituencies' preferences, well aware that while the issue of the Constitution could not entirely change the outcome of an election, it could certainly sway it a little. So, for instance, the left-wing parties knew that their constituencies were strongly pro-European. The parties' support for the Constitution therefore was expected to pay off during the parliamentary and presidential elections because the issue would provide the undecided, potential left-wing electorate with an additional incentive to vote. After the corruption scandals of 2001/2, the legitimacy of left-wing parties had been seriously undermined as far as domestic issues were concerned. So, by supporting the Constitution, the left-wing parties hoped to win back some of their electorate and also to attract right-wing Constitutional proponents. The situation was entirely different at the right end of the political spectrum. In the constituencies of the liberal conservative Civic Platform, there was moderate support for the Constitution, so the party distanced itself from its former radically negative position on the issue, preferring instead to adopt a neutral stance. 13 The other important right-wing party, Law and Justice, did not face a similar problem. Their anti-constitutional stance already reflected the preferences of their eurosceptical constituency. 
AGAINST
If a new draft of the constitution was put forward, the latest possible term to schedule a referendum in Poland.
The national and non-national actors shaping the Polish discussion on the Constitution did not change over time. However, while the actors remained the same for the whole research period, there were phases when some would play a more dominant role in the debate than others. For instance, in the period from autumn 2003 to spring 2004 the electoral debate was mostly dominated by journalists, executives and political parties. After the French "No", experts, journalists, and members of the public (the latter generally only as passive agents) dominated the discussion with their cross-border and normative debates.
II.2 Constitutional Topics
In order to understand the limited diversity of constitutional topics included in the national debate, it is necessary to look at the background to the Polish position on the Constitution. It is possible to identify four phases in the Polish debate on the Constitution (Koenig, 2005) . In the first one, between October and December 2003, Poland stated its official position and established an alliance with Spain, who was also against any change to the voting rules enshrined in the Nice Treaty. Poland entered the negotiations with the famous slogan "Nice or Death", which eventually blocked the negotiations. In general terms, Poland was in favour of the Constitution but a condition of its support was that the following changes be made: (a) that a religious reference be included in the preamble, (b) that there be one commissioner per state, (c) that, in terms of security policy, NATO provide the basis for EU security and (d) that the voting rules laid out in the Nice Treaty be adopted (the most important provision). In the second phase, between March and June 2004, Poland lost its strategic partner, Spain. After the parliamentary elections in Spain, the new Prime Minister Zapatero was open to compromise and decided to support the double majority voting rule. Poland was concerned that if the government continued to insist upon the Nice voting rules, Poland would be alienated from the other EU member states, so eventually the national representation accepted a compromise. In the third phase the national debate concentrated on the timing of the Polish referendum and its alternative scheduling to coincide with the parliamentary, presidential, or local elections in autumn 2005/spring 2006. In that phase the timing of the referendum was a highly politicized issue. First of all, political actors were afraid that the turn-out for the referendum might be poor (in other words, below 50%) and -given the reputation that Poland had earned during negotiations over the weighted votes -that this would eventually make Poland a black sheep in the eyes of the rest of the EU. Secondly, scheduling the constitutional referendum to coincide with the presidential elections was expected to shift the balance of votes in favour of the left-wing candidate. For this reason, political parties had widely differing opinions on the most suitable date for the referendum. Finally, a fourth phase began with the French rejection of the Constitution, during which period the electoral debate in Poland was displaced by the normative and cross-border discourses. The emphasis shifted towards evaluation of the arguments used by other national publics. The table below shows the sequence of EU and related national events during the period under research. In sum, general constitutional topics predominated. Furthermore, the constitutional process earned more coverage than particular provisions of the Constitution. For instance, the general code "Constitution" accounts for 27% of all topics covered by the print media, whilst Constitutional process account for 56%. This latter figure also includes discussion of the timing of the referendum in Poland. The topic translation of the Constitution, being an unusually important issue in the Polish debate, accounts for no less than 19% of all topics covered by newspapers. 
II.3 Argumentative Strategies
Analysis of the Polish media reveals that three distinct argumentative strategies were used in coverage of the constitutional issue. The 'quality publication' group consisting of Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Newsweek, Wprost, Europa and Tygodnik Powszechny attempted to give objective although not always very detailed accounts. In comparison to the 'highbrow' press, the tabloid media, as exemplified by Super Express, barely covered constitutional topics at all. In general, the tabloid press articles provided only brief and cursory coverage of the subject. The sectoral Nasz Dziennik developed a distinctive argumentative strategy in this context. Its approach combined a suspicious attitude towards EU issues with a lack of consistency in terms of its position on any given topic. With the exception of definitive statements on the subject of an EU constitution, which were most often made by experts or academics writing for the quality press, the other argumentative strategies were used by basically all the actors taking part in the Polish debate. However, the presentation of constitutional topics differed according to whether they were being covered by the quality, tabloid or sectoral-populist media. This section will provide some examples of typical usage of the various argumentative strategies in the different publication types. The following examples demonstrate different usages of definitive statements in the quality press and sectoral-populist media respectively. The definitive statements used in quality press were precise and coherent though the topic was not always clearly delineated. Nasz Dziennik, on the contrary, had a tendency to very expressionistic but also superstitious definitive statements. 
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Designative statements were most often used to report on an event such as a signing summit. While the statements in the quality press were very focused on the issue, the tabloid press often combined a sentence or paragraph on an official EU event with informal information such as celebrity gossip. Finally, designative statements found in Nasz Dziennik contained vocabulary that was far from neutral, referring, for example, to a European super-state. 
"Support for the European Constitution in
"Signing the Constitution for the European Union is a first step towards changing the identity of our continent. If the European nations don't sober up and agree to ratify this
19 "Ze strony polskiej pod dokumentem podpisali się premier Marek Belka (52 l.) i szef dyplomacji Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Kiedy szef rządu podpisywał konstytucję, jego żona Krystyna zwiedzała Rzym. Chodziła po ulicach Zatybrza -biednej, robotniczej dzielnicy Wiecznego Miasta." 20 "Mimo sprzeciwu większości partii opozycyjnych Rada Ministrów uchwaliła wczoraj zgodę na złożenie przez premiera podpisu pod konstytucją Unii Europejskiej, która ma stopić państwa narodowe w jedno europejskie superpaństwo."
21 "Miał być tekst, który poruszy, urzeknie, pomoże uświadomić Polakom, że należą do europejskiej rodziny. Powstała spisana biurokratycznym eurożargonem, trudna do zrozumienia instrukcja obsługi." "Pomysł ten nie od dziś popiera lewica, która jednomyślnie opowiada się za przyjęciem przez Polskę konstytucji europejskiej. -Najlepiej, by referendum odbyło się przy pierwszej turze -mówi Marek Dyduch, sekretarz generalny SLD. -Wówczas wszyscy kandydaci na prezydenta będą musieli przedstawić jasne stanowisko wobec konstytucji europejskiej."
'cabinet Constitution,' the funeral of Europe as we have traditionally understood it will become a fact." ("Cabinet constitution," Goss, Małgorzata, Nasz Dziennik).
"[The European Constitution] should not be the 1000-page-long babble of political psychopaths." ("Readers judge," SE, Super Express).
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Finally, evaluative statements such as "important/unimportant" or "difficult/easy/neutral" were used rather rarely and usually only in very general contexts:
"John Paul II said that the Treaty is "an extremely important moment in the building of a new Europe". Unlike Polish politicians, he views the Constitution 'with trust.'" ("After signing, before ratification," Makowski and Sierakowski, Tygodnik Powszechny).
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Equally and oppositely, the Constitution was also evaluated as unimportant:
"Let's put symbols to one side and ask ourselves whether the Constitution introduces anything new. Not really. In point of fact, it only repeats provisions from previous treaties, and these will not be annulled simply because the Constitution is blocked. Realistically speaking, the Constitution would change very little and its rejection is therefore not a catastrophe." ("The free market is good for us," Gadomski, Witold,
Rzeczpospolita; argument by Rostowski, Jacek).
25
The evaluative concept "difficult" was used predominantly in relation to the crisis following ratification failure, for instance:
"Extracting the most important parts from the Constitution and treating them independently from the whole Treaty is too complicated." ("Silence regarding the
Constitution," Pawlicki, Jacek, Gazeta Wyborcza). 
II.4 Motives and justifications
It is possible to identify some regularity with respect to the discourse of justifications and motives within the normative, electoral, and cross-border debates. Within the electoral debate, the dominant actors were political parties and journalists. Politicians were not very active themselves as far as writing editorials was concerned; therefore, their opinions were most often articulated and evaluated by journalists. As a consequence, the most popular motives that journalists identified on the part of political parties were vote-seeking and office-seeking. The politicians themselves, by contrast, tended to justify their position in terms of democratic values, participation, national or citizens' interests, arguing, for instance, that organizing a referendum to coincide with the presidential elections was in the citizens' best interests and would enhance democracy in Poland. Interestingly, while Polish domestic actors identified participation as the level of voter turn-out, the supranational ones conceptualized it widely as the degree of 'citizens' involvement' in EU matters. 27 "Trudno jednak z wypowiedzi liderów tej formacji dociec, czy PO jest "za" Konstytucją, czy "przeciw". Szef Platformy Donald Tusk powiedział, że decyzji w tej sprawie należy się spodziewać... najwcześniej na wiosnę przyszłego roku. Największa partia opozycyjna, formacja tworząca gabinet cieni nie ma wyrobionego zdania na temat unijnej Konstytucji!"
In the cross-border debate journalists or experts usually explained EU events or the outcome of the referenda in terms of lack of understanding between elites and citizens. In the normative debate, two patterns can be identified. For authors writing in the quality press, the French-German alliance was a reason to reject the Constitution and opt for staying with the Nice system, which was better from the perspective of Polish economic and political interests. Importantly, these authors were not against the EU or Polish membership thereof, rather, they argued that an EU functioning according to the Nice system would have a more positive impact on the member states' economies while ensuring that Poland had a stronger political position in EU institutions.
In Nasz Dziennik, France and Germany were accused of attempting to dominate other member states politically. For Nasz Dziennik these attempts were often seen as sufficient reason to argue against the Polish membership in the EU. However, it should also be borne in mind that the authors of these claims made many factual errors or used terminology incorrectly. Moreover, they were not consistent and changed their minds on the Polish membership in the EU from one article to the next. The following examples illustrate that: 
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In the normative debate, a second pattern emerges involving public opinion data before and after the French "No". Before the referendum in France, journalists and experts pointed to the fact that support for the Constitution was a result of a "logic of consequentiality". As the public survey analysis has shown, the majority of Poles were in favour of the Constitution (56% of all respondents). When asked to justify their opinion, 47% of constitutional supporters said they would vote "Yes" because they supported Polish membership of the EU. What was also quite telling was that 23% justified their opinion by saying that it is necessary to vote for the Constitution because a Polish "No" could have a negative impact on the country. Only 15% of those supporting the Constitution said they did so because its provisions were good for Poland. On the other hand, 44% of the Constitution's opponents decided to vote against it because it was not of benefit to Poland. Among them 25% gave the lack of reference to Christian values in the preamble as a reason. 36 . The social survey conducted after the French and Dutch "no-vote" established 33 "I tak utopijna wiara w bezbożny rozum przeradza się w niespotykany koszmar i zniewolenie. Trzeba podkreślić jeszcze raz: współpraca i wolna wspólnota tak! Jedno zaś germańsko-frankońskie imperium kolonialne -nie!" 34 "Najgorsze, że całą ideologię nowej Europy, i konteksty umysłowe, i kulturalne, przejęli w Maastricht ateiści i masoni -francuscy, belgijscy, holenderscy, niemieccy, angielscy, w tym i żydowscy. Odsunęli oni od wpływów Kościół katolicki, a szczególnie papiestwo." that 47% of all respondents could not say if the French and Dutch rejection of the Treaty was good or bad. According to the same survey, 78% of respondents deemed their knowledge of the Constitution to be "insufficient" and only 15% claimed to have adequate knowledge of the subject. This would explain why Poles could not say whether the French and Dutch "No" was good or bad. Moreover, having insufficient knowledge about the text of the Constitution, the Polish public was more susceptible to the forward-looking justifications appearing in that context. Voting "Yes" to the Constitution was in their view a natural logical progression from their "Yes" vote in the accession referendum. On the other hand, constitutional opponents often remained in favour of Polish membership in the EU but did not want to deepen integration, and rejection of the Constitution was a way of signalling that preference. 
III. Synthesis
Through our print media analysis, we have identified three strands in the debate on the Constitutional Treaty in Poland: normative, electoral and cross-border. Actors discussing the Constitution within the framework of the normative debate were mostly interested in general visions of Europe enshrined in the Treaty. Interestingly, the Constitution was often associated with conflicting visions, for instance, 'liberal', 'social', 'atheist' or 'multicultural'. Therefore, the arguments "for" and "against" were often used not in relation to the Treaty as such but rather in relation to a particular vision of Europe which the Constitution was believed to promote. Polish actors were either against the social vision of Europe or they argued that Constitution as such did not promote either a social or a liberal Europe although people tended to view it through the lense of context issues nonetheless. In the electoral debate the Constitution was employed predominantly as a vote-seeking or office-securing device within an exclusively domestic context. In short, it was expected to enhance political actors' position in the elections. The central issue for the political parties became the timing of the Constitutional referendum and the question of whether it should be scheduled to coincide with the presidential or parliamentary elections.
The Polish cross-border debate provided information on the domestic profile of constitutional discussions taking place in other EU states. The media reported and evaluated key constitutional events or arguments raised in other member states. Although the visibility of external actors was fairly high in the Polish discussion, only a limited number of arguments were taken up by the Polish actors. In most cases the Polish media merely gave an account of an event or a discussion without actively responding to the foreign actors' arguments.
The following table shows the various levels of transnationalization in the Polish constitutional debate. The lowest level being visibility, the second, reaction to arguments, and the third, exchange of argumentation. The attitude toward EU membership is a useful aid to mapping the constitutional discourses in the various member states. In Poland a strict division between those in favour of and those against European integration was not observed during the period of research but rather something that might best be described as 'fuzzy EU opposition'. The results of our analysis of print media in Poland showed that the populist-catholic daily Nasz Dziennik published opinions both in favour of Polish membership in the EU and against it. Furthermore, these diametrically opposed statements came from a single author and were penned in the space of only two weeks. The author was strongly in favour of the idea of European integration and traced it back to the medieval idea of a 'Europe united in Christ'. He also supported market integration and promotion of democratic values. But elsewhere he was against the Constitution, which he believed was taking away states' sovereign powers. The 'Union' which he therefore advocated was a common market union of sovereign nation-states. In another article published within two weeks of this one, the same author was arguing against EU membership saying that Poland would be 'better-off' without the Union which was nothing more than a Franco-German conspiracy. Interestingly, he claimed to support politicization of the Union, but not an 'EU-empire'. It needs to be noted that this inconsistent voice was an exception not only in the whole print media sample but also in Nasz Dziennik. Other authors writing for this daily were openly against the Constitution but in favour of the EU and remained very consistent in their position. Nasz Dziennik is related to the radical party of so-called 'fighting Catholicism': The League of Polish Families, which was against the EU membership during the preaccession period. However, after accession the party has gradually come to terms with Polish membership of the EU. Therefore, in the period of research there was no longer any party on the Polish political scene which opposed EU membership. Only in their attitude towards the Constitution could a political divide be discerned.
The figure below maps Polish discourse on Constitution:
Figure 2: European political discourse in Poland. We can identify some general characteristics as far as the patterns of inclusion and exclusion of particular actors are concerned. Firstly, the diversity of national and foreign actors involved in the discussion was rather low, which in turn resulted in limited diversity in terms of the issues raised in the national debate. Secondly, the public as actor did not set the agenda in Poland, and, as such the constitutional process remained very elitist and detached from citizens. Low personalisation was another striking feature of the Polish debate. Although the various parties made their positions on the Constitution clear, individual politicians, especially constitutional proponents, were not interested in initiating national debate or in bringing the Constitution closer to the Polish citizens. The issue of the constitutional referendum, discussed predominantly within the framework of the electoral debate, fell hostage to domestic politics.
SLD-Sojusz
Had the referendum taken place before the French "No", Polish citizens would very probably have cast their votes in favour of the Constitution, regardless of whether the referendum had coincided with the national elections or taken place separately. 38 Had the referendum taken place after the French "No", the outcome would be less certain. Poles felt "lost" when the French and the Dutch rejected the Constitution. In the light of social survey data, people were ready to support the Constitution because they believed it to be the next logical step in the integration process. The French and Dutch rejections have undermined the Poles' faith in this inexorable logic, prompting them to view the Constitution with greater suspicion. If the Polish referendum had taken place after the 37 Or simply ignored the issue in the parliamentary and presidential campaign. 38 In the light of social survey research.
French, the turn-out probably would not have been sufficient to ratify the Constitution in a referendum. It is probable that the new right-wing parliamentary majority will vote against this particular Constitution, unless it becames the subject of economic intergovernmental bargaining. Given this instrumental approach to the Constitution it is not unthinkable that the new government may trade this Constitution for political or economic gain or, alternatively, endorse another project for the same strategic reasons 39 .
Conclusions.
The Polish constitutional discussion was shaped by three different debates, involving different actors and encouraging different "perceptions" of the Constitution. Most often, the Constitution was perceived in the Polish discussion either as a vote-seeking device or as a document promoting a particular ideology or vision of Europe; be it social or liberal. The electoral debate was dominated by journalists and politicians who employed the Constitution as a vote-garnering strategy. By means of the cross-border debate journalists and experts introduced foreign national discussions to the Polish public. The normative debate provided the space for discussing and critically evaluating competing visions of Europe. That debate has also affected public opinion very strongly. According to social survey data, Poles supported the Constitution because of a "logic of consequentiality". According to social surveys quoted in the media, Poles did not feel competent enough to assess constitutional provisions. Yet, the majority was willing to vote for the Constitution, justifying their decision in terms of a general vision of a united Europe, of which Poland had become an integral part. Obviously, the fact that the Polish public knew little about the constitutional text is alarming. Conscious decisions should be based on adequate knowledge, which the Poles by their own admission do not have. Because de facto public debate did not take place in Poland, the public knew little about the Constitution and was unable to assess whether the Nice Treaty or Constitution best reflected their vision of the EU. Empirical information on voters' preferences with regard to Nice or an EU Constitution is basically non-existent. The national position was determined at an elite level and neither the provisions of the Nice Treaty nor the Constitution seriously entered the electoral agenda. This has led to a paradoxical situation whereby the political representatives have decided on an issue for which they were not elected. The constitutional process in the EU was envisaged as a 'pouvoir constituent mixte,' which is to say one involving both the member states and their citizens. In Poland, then, one of the basic requirements of the process, namely, involvement of the people, was not fulfilled. Instrumentalization of the Constitution in the electoral discourse has only trivialized the issue while at the same time wasting the opportunity to initiate worthwhile public discussion. 39 In spring 2006 we already witnessed some attempts of this kind.
Appendix.
The initial sample of daily newpapers was selected using the Factiva database search engine; however, since the data for the Polish dailies was not complete, additional searches were conducted in the archives of the dailies. None of the weeklies were available in Factiva, therefore, these articles were obtained from the archives. The search-terms were the following: "Union's Constitution", "European Constitution", "Constitution for Europe", "Euro-constitution" and "Constitutional Treaty".
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For the detailed analysis, 29 substantive articles were selected. The selection strategy was three-fold; from the articles published between October 2004 and October 2005, the selected sample was proportional to the media coverage in each month. The sample was composed of articles that were substantive or very relevant to the domestic discussion. In order to make sure that the articles are relevant and allowing for comparison with the other country studies, the selection also covers the following EU-events: signing of the constitutional treaty in Rome (Oct 2004), the Spanish referendum (Feb 2005) , the French referendum (May 2005), the Dutch referendum (July), the Luxembourg referendum (July), the Luxembourg presidency summit, the reflection period (September), the British EU presidency summit or Blair speech in EP (September) and parliamentary ratification of the EU constitution in the country under study.
